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The famous Harsanyi's (1973) Theorem states that generically  a finite game has an odd number of Nash 
equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, we show that for finite multicriteria games (games with vector-valued 
payoffs) this kind of result does not hold. In particular, we show, by examples, that it is possible to find balls in the 
space of games such that every game in this set has uncountably many equilibria so that uncountable sets of 
equilibria are not nongeneric in multicriteria games. Moreover, we point out that, surprisingly, all the equilibria of 
the games cor- responding to the center of these balls are essential, that is, they are stable with respect to every 
possible perturbation on the data of the game. However, if we consider the scalarization stable equilibrium 
concept (introduced in De Marco and Morgan (2007) and which is based on the scalarization technique for 
multicriteria games), then we show that it provides an effective selection device for the equilibria of the games 
corresponding to the centers of the balls. This means that the scalarization stable equilibrium concept can provide 
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Harsanyi (1973) proved that generically a ¯nite game has an odd number of Nash equilib-
ria in mixed strategies and that they are all regular. Regularity of an equilibrium implies
that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence, that is, the set-valued map de-
¯ned in the space of games having the same strategy sets that associates to every game
the set of its Nash equilibria, is the graph of a continuous function in a neighborhood of
such equilibrium considered as a point in the graph (see also Ritzberger (1994) or van
Damme (1989)). Obviously, this property implies stability of the equilibrium with respect
to every possible perturbation on the data of the game.
However, when an equilibrium is not regular it might be \unstable" with respect
to perturbations on the strategies or on the payo®s and therefore re¯nements of the
Nash equilibrium concept have been introduced in order to select equilibria stable with
respect to particular classes of perturbation. Just to quote a few, we recall perfectness
(Selten 1975), properness (Myerson (1978), essentiality (Jiang and Wu (1965)), strategic
stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). In particular, essentiality is the property of an
equilibrium to be stable with respect to every possible perturbation on the payo®s of a
game.
In this paper, we show by examples that, when the payo®s of the game are vector-
valued (multicriteria games), the previous considerations about the non genericity of
in¯nite sets of equilibria do not hold anymore. Recall that multicriteria games describe
strategic interactions in which players have di®erent goals whose relative values cannot be
ascertained a-priori, for example, representing a single individual with multiple objectives
or an organization of individuals which have to jointly take a single decision and where
each of the criteria corresponds to the concerns of a di®erent faction of the organization.
Di®erent extensions of the classical concept of Nash equilibrium have been adopted for
multicriteria games; the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as
introduced in Shapley (1959), play a fundamental role and satisfy existence theorems
under classical assumptions. We consider these concepts of equilibrium and ¯nd balls in
the space of games such that every element in this set has uncountably many equilibria so
that uncountable sets of equilibria are not nongeneric in multicriteria games. Moreover,
we show that, surprisingly, all the equilibria of the games corresponding to the centers of
these balls are essential, that is, they are stable with respect to every possible perturbation
on the data of the game. More precisely, we present two examples which independently
satisfy these properties; however, the ¯rst example is much easier from the mathematical
point of view (just two strategies for each player and only one vector-valued payo®) but
it is much less interesting from the game theoretic point of view since it involves a trivial
best reply correspondence of the ¯rst player which coincides with his strategy set for every
strategy of the second player. Therefore, the ¯rst example shows that the results hold in
the simplest class of multicriteria games and the second example (in which the ¯rst player
has three strategies instead of two) emphasizes that the results coming out from the ¯rst
example do not depend on the degenerate behavior of the best reply correspondences and
may arise in nontrivial games.
In the ¯nal part of the paper, we notice that, even though essentiality is usually a very
2sharp selection device, another kind of stability requirement (namely the scalarization-
stable equilibrium concept de¯ned in De Marco and Morgan (2007)) provides an e®ective
selection device for the weak Pareto-Nash equilibria of the games in both the examples.
The scalarization-stable equilibrium concept is based on the following scalarization tech-
nique for ¯nite multicriteria games studied in Shapley (1959): every weak Pareto-Nash
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a scalar game in which the real-valued payo® is
obtained by weighting the components of the vector-valued payo® with weights in the
simplex (called trade-o® game), and conversely. In other words, when an equilibrium x
of a multicriteria game is played, the choice of a strategy xi by a player i as a best reply
to his opponents' strategy pro¯le x¡i implicitly implies that Player i is using particular
total order relations to implement xi as a maximum point and Player i is assuming the
others playing x¡i and then, he is implicitly assuming the others using particular total
order relations. Therefore scalarization-stable equilibria are obtained by perturbing the
weights in the scalarization and by requiring a lower semicontinuity-like stability in the
equilibria, in order to capture the stability of the equilibrium with respect to perturba-
tions on the total order relations of every player and with respect to perturbations on
the expectations of each player about others' total order relations. As a ¯nal remark,
the examples presented in this paper show also that essentiality in a multicriteria game
di®ers from essentiality in the corresponding trade-o® games, since there exists (at least)
an essential (weak Pareto-Nash) equilibrium of the multicriteria game such that, for ev-
ery possible scalarization, it is not an essential (Nash) equilibrium of the corresponding
trade-o® game. This latter result is in line with an analogous result obtained for perfect
equilibria in Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic de¯nitions of equi-
librium in multicriteria games and introduces the genericity problem in ¯nite games. In
Section 3, the two examples are analyzed. Section 4 presents the scalarization stable
equilibrium concept and its application to the examples.
2 Finite Multicriteria Normal Form Games
2.1 Equilibria
Multicriteria games describe interactions in which players' payo® are vector-valued func-
tions; which means that players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't
have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all their criteria. Given a n-player
¯nite game ­ = fI;ª1;:::;ªn;H1;:::;Hng where ªi = fÃ1
i;:::;Ã
k(i)
i g is the (¯nite) pure
strategy set of player i, ª =
Q
i2I ªi and Hi : ª ! Rr(i) is the vector-valued payo® func-
tion of player i, then in this section ¡ = fI;X1;:::;Xn;J1;:::;Jng denotes the mixed





















i (Ã) for all x 2 X and for all h = 1;:::;r(i):
In case the players act non-cooperatively, di®erent extensions of the classical concept of
Nash equilibrium have been adopted; however, the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash and
Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as introduced in Shapley (1959), play a fundamental role (see
Wang (1993) for more general existence theorems and Morgan (2005) for variational sta-
bility, well-posedness and for an extensive list of references). We recall here some classical
de¯nitions and notations:
Definition 2.1: Given x¡i 2 X¡i, the strategy b xi 2 Xi is said to be strongly (Pareto)
dominated by the strategy xi 2 Xi if the vector Ji (b xi;x¡i) is strongly (Pareto) dominated
by the vector Ji (xi;x¡i), that is
Ji (xi;x¡i) ¡ Ji (b xi;x¡i) 2 intR
r(i)
+ :
While, the strategy b xi 2 Xi is said to be (Pareto) dominated by the strategy xi 2 Xi if
the vector Ji (b xi;x¡i) is (Pareto) dominated by the vector Ji (xi;x¡i), that is
Ji (xi;x¡i) ¡ Ji (b xi;x¡i) 2 R
r(i)
+ n f0g:
Let Ji(Xi;x¡i) = fJi(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 Xig, a vector yi is a weak Pareto point in Ji(Xi;x¡i) if
it is not strongly dominated by any other vector in Ji(Xi;x¡i), i.e. @zi 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such
that zi ¡ yi 2 intR
r(i)
+ . A vector yi is a Pareto point in Ji(Xi;x¡i) if it is not dominated
by any other vector in Ji(Xi;x¡i), i.e. @zi 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such that zi ¡ yi 2 R
r(i)
+ n f0g.
For every player i, let Wi : X¡i Ã Rr(i) be the set-valued map where
Wi(x¡i) is the set of all weak Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i) for all x¡i 2 X¡i: (1)
and Pi : X¡i Ã Rr(i) be the set-valued map where
Pi(x¡i) is the set of all Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i) for all x¡i 2 X¡i: (2)
Finally, for every player i and for every x¡i 2 X¡i, a strategy xi is a weak Pareto solution
for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi if
xi 2 Argwmax
xi2Xi
Ji(xi;x¡i) = fxi 2 Xi j Ji(xi;x¡i) 2 Wi(x¡i)g (3)
and a strategy xi is a Pareto solution for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi if
xi 2 Argmax
xi2Xi
Ji(xi;x¡i) = fxi 2 Xi j Ji(xi;x¡i) 2 Pi(x¡i)g: (4)
Note that





4Definition 2.2: (Shapley (1959)). A strategy pro¯le x 2 X is a weak Pareto-Nash
equilibrium if, for every player i, xi is a weak-Pareto solution for the vector-valued function
Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi; while x 2 X is a Pareto-Nash equilibrium if, for every player i, xi is a
Pareto solution for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi.
Moreover, we recall that di®erent interesting attempts have been made to generalize
some re¯nement concepts for Nash equilibria to the above solution concepts (see Puerto
and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999) for perfect equilibria, Yang
and Yu (2002) for essential equilibria).
2.2 Genericity
Scalar Games
In order to illustrate the genericity problem for multicriteria games, we ¯rst recall the basic
genericity arguments for the class of scalar games. Let P = fI;ª1;:::;ªn;v1;:::;vng
denote a ¯nite game, where vi : ª ! R is the payo® function of player i. In this case, we
denote with G = fI;X1;:::;Xn;f1;:::;fng its mixed extension where the expected payo®






vi(Ã) for all x 2 X: Let
jªj = K denote the cardinality of the set of all pure strategy pro¯les, then every payo®
function vi : ª ! R has ¯nite range, in particular yi = (vi(Ã))Ã2ª is a K-dimensional
vector for every player i. Then, it is possible to identify the mixed extension G of the
game P with the point y = (y1;:::;yn) 2 RnK. Therefore, denoting with G(X1;:::;Xn)
the set of n-player ¯nite games with mixed strategy sets (X1;:::;Xn), there is a one to
one correspondence between RnK and G(X1;:::;Xn). Then, one can de¯ne a distance,
denoted by d(G0;G00), between the games G0 and G00 using the classical Euclidean distance
between the corresponding vectors in RnK. Following this approach, it has been proved
(see Harsanyi (1973) or Ritzberger (1994)) that almost all games in RnK have an odd
number of Nash equilibria and that they are all regular. More precisely, the graph of the
Nash equilibrium correspondence N : G(X1;:::;Xn) Ã X is given by the union of an
odd number of graphs of continuous functions outside a residual in G(X1;:::;Xn). We
will show in the next section that this kind of characterization does not hold in the case
of multicriteria games.
Moreover, we recall that
Definition 2.3: (Wu and Jiang (1962)). An equilibrium in mixed strategies x¤ of G is
said to be an essential equilibrium for G if for every ´ > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that
for every game G0 with d(G;G0) < ± there exists an equilibrium x0 with d(x¤;x0) < ´.
Multicriteria games
If ­ = fI;ª1;:::;ªn;H1;:::;Hng denotes a n-player ¯nite game in pure strategies and
¡ = fI;X1;:::;Xn;J1;:::;Jng denotes the mixed extension of ­. For every player i, wi =
(Ji(Ã))Ã2ª is a r(i)K-dimensional vector for every player i. Then, it is possible to identify
the mixed extension ¡ of the game ­ with the point w = (w1;:::;wn) 2 R(
P
i2I r(i))K.
Therefore, denoting with MG(X1;:::;Xn) the set of n-player ¯nite multicriteria games
5with mixed strategy sets (X1;:::;Xn) and payo® dimensions r(i) with i = 1;:::;n,
there is a one to one correspondence between R(
P
i2I r(i))K and MG(X1;:::;Xn). Then,
analogously to the scalar case, one can de¯ne a distance, denoted by d(¡0;¡00), between the
games ¡0 and ¡00 using the classical Euclidean distance between the corresponding vectors
in R(
P
i2I r(i))K. Then, we can de¯ne the weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium correspondence
WPN : MG(X1;:::;Xn) Ã X. We show below, by an example, that the images of
the set-valued map of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria have uncountably many elements for
every point in a particular open ball in MG(X1;:::;Xn) and that WPN is continuous
in the sense of Painlev¶ e-Kuratowski in the center of the ball. This implies that every
weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium of this game is essential (see Yang and Yu (2002) for the
natural extension to multicriteria games of the essential equilibrium concept). We recall
that a set-valued map K : MG(X1;:::;Xn) Ã X is continuous (in the sense of Painlev¶ e-
Kuratowski) in w 2 MG(X1;:::;Xn) if and only if K is lower semicontinuous and closed
in w (see for example Aubin and Frankowska (1990) or Border (1985)).
3 The Examples
Example 3.1: We consider the following multicriteria game ¡1 in which Player 1 has two
criteria, selects rows and has two strategies, Player 2 has one criterion, selects columns







Payo®s of Player 1 Payo®s of Player 2
We consider mixed strategies and we denote with p = Prob(T) and q = Prob(L). With
an abuse of notation, we denote with Xi the set of strategies of player i de¯ned as follows
X1 = [0;1] and X2 = [0;1], since there is a one to one correspondence between the set of
mixed strategies of player i and Xi.
For every q 2 [0;1], J1(T;q) = (1;0), J1(B;q) = (0;1) so the set W1(q) of weak Pareto
points in J1(X1;q) coincides with J1(X1;q). Then, the best reply correspondence of Player
1 is given by:
Argwmax
p2X1
J1(p;q) = X1 8q 2 [0;1]







f1g if p > 1=2
X2 if p = 1=2
f0g if p < 1=2
:
Denoted with V1 = f(p;0) j p 2 [0;1=2[g; V2 = f(1=2;q) j q 2 [0;1]g; V3 = f(p;1) j p 2
]1=2;1]g, the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN = V1 [ V2 [ V3: Consider now a
perturbation of the previous game:
6L R
T (1+"1;1,"1;2) (1+"2;1 , "2;2)




Payo®s of Player 1 Payo®s of Player 2
Denoted with g±(p) = p(2+±1 ¡±2 ¡±3 +±4)¡(1+±4 ¡±3); the payo® function of Player






Let ±i, with i = 1;:::;4, be su±ciently small, there exists a unique element p± in [0;1]









f1g if p > p±
X1 if p = p±
f0g if p < p±
;
In order to calculate the best replies of Player 1, note that, for every q 2 [0;1],
J"
1(T;q) = (1 + q("1;1 ¡ "2;1) + "2;1;q("1;2 ¡ "2;2) + "2;2);
J"
1(B;q) = (q("3;1 ¡ "4;1) + "4;1;1 + q("3;2 ¡ "4;2) + "4;2)
It can be checked that, for "i;j su±ciently small, the set W"
1(q) of weak Pareto points in
J"






1(p;q) = X1 8q 2 [0;1]
Denoted with V±
1 = f(p;0) j p 2 [0;p±[g; V±
2 = f(p±;q) j q 2 [0;1]g; V±
3 = f(p;1) j p 2





3. Then p± ! 1=2 as the vector ± ! 0, so that WPN
";± ! WPN in the sense
of Painlev¶ e-Kuratowski as " ! 0 and ± ! 0.
Example 3.2: We consider the following multicriteria game ¡2 in which Player 1 has two
criteria, selects rows and has three strategies, Player 2 has one criterion, selects columns
and has two strategies and where the payo®s are given as follows
L R
T (1,1) (0,0)






Payo®s of Player 1 Payo®s of Player 2
We consider mixed strategies and we denote with p1 = Prob(T), p2 = Prob(M), 1¡p1 ¡
p2 = Prob(B) and q = Prob(L), 1¡q = Prob(R). With an abuse of notation, we denote
with Xi the set of strategies of player i de¯ned as follows
X1 = f(p1;p2) 2 R
2 j p1;p2 ¸ 0; p1 + p2 · 1g; X2 = fq 2 R j 0 · q · 1g;
7since there is a one to one correspondence between the set of mixed strategies of player i
and Xi.
For every q 2 [0;1], J1(T;q) = (q;q), J1(M;q) = (1¡q;1¡q) and J1(B;q) = (2+q;¡1)
so for every q 2 [0;1] the set J1(X1;q) of the images of the vector-valued expected payo® of
Player 1 is given by the convex hull of the points (q;q);(1¡q;1¡q);(2+q;¡1). Denote with
°1(q) the segment joining J1(T;q) to J1(M;q), with °2(q) the segment joining J1(M;q) to
J1(B;q) and with °3(q) the segment joining J1(T;q) with J1(B;q). Then one can check





°2(q) if q 2 [0;1=2[
°1(q) [ °2(q) [ °3(q) = °2(q) = °3(q) if q = 1=2
°3(q) if q 2]1=2;1]
:







f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q 2 [0;1=2[
X1 if q = 1=2
f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p2 = 0g if q 2]1=2;1]







f1g if p1 > p2
X2 if p1 = p2
f0g if p1 < p2
:
Denoted with
P1 = f(0;p2;0) j p2 2]0;1]g
P2 = f(0;0;q) j q 2 [0;1]g
P3 = f(p1;p2;1=2) j p2 = p1; p1 2]0;1=2]g
P4 = f(p1;0;1) j p1 2]0;1]g
;
the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN is
WPN = P1 [ P2 [ P3 [ P4:
Consider now a perturbation of the previous game:
L R
T (1+"1;1,1+"1;2) ("2;1 , "2;2)






Payo®s of Player 1 Payo®s of Player 2
Denoted with
g
±(p1;p2) = p1(1 + ±1 ¡ ±2 ¡ ±5 + ±6) ¡ p2(1 ¡ ±3 + ±4 + ±5 ¡ ±6) ¡ (±6 ¡ ±5);















f1g if g±(p1;p2) > 0
X2 if g±(p1;p2) = 0
f0g if g±(p1;p2) < 0
;
In order to calculate the best replies of Player 1, note that, for every q 2 [0;1],
J"
1(T;q) = (q(1 + "1;1 ¡ "2;1) + "2;1;q(1 + "1;2 ¡ "2;2) + "2;2);
J"
1(M;q) = (q("3;1 ¡ "4;1 ¡ 1) + 1 + "4;1;q("3;2 ¡ "4;2 ¡ 1) + 1 + "4;2))
J"
1(B;q) = (q(1 + "5;1 ¡ "6;1) + 2 + "6;1;q("5;2 ¡ "6;2) ¡ 1 + "6;2)
For every q 2 [0;1], the set J"
1(X1;q) of the images of the vector-valued expected payo® of
Player 1 is the convex hull of the points J"
1(M;q);J"
1(T;q);J"









3(q) the segment joining J"
1(T;q) with J"
1(B;q). Denote also with
q
" =
1 + "4;1 ¡ "2;1




1 + "4;2 ¡ "2;2
2 + "1;2 ¡ "2;2 ¡ "3;2 + "4;2
:
where q" is such that the ¯rst components of J"
1(T;q") and J"
1(M;q") coincide and q" is
such that the second components of J"
1(T;q") and J"
1(M;q") coincide.
Case 1: Assume that q" < q". For "i;j su±ciently small, if q < q" then J"
1(M;q)
strongly dominates J"
1(T;q), if q" · q · q" then J"
1(M;q) and J"
1(T;q) are not comparable,
¯nally if q" < q then J"
1(T;q) strongly dominates J"
1(M;q). Moreover, there exists a point
b q" 2 [q";q"] such that J"
1(T;q), J"
1(M;q), J"
1(B;q) lie on the same line. A simple geometric
analysis shows that even when q 2 [q"; b q"[ the set °"
1(q) n fJ"
1(M;q)g is strongly Pareto
dominated by °"
2(q) and therefore it is easy to check that the set W"
1(q) of weak Pareto
points in J"












3(q) if q 2 q = b q"
°"
3(q) if q 2]b q";1]
:









f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q 2 [0; b q"[
X1 if q = b q"




3 be the subset of X1 £ X2 such that
P
";±
3 = f(p1;p2; b q
") jg
±(p1;p2) = 0g:
9Then, the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN
";± in the perturbed game is
WPN
";± = P1 [ P2 [ P
";±
3 [ P4:
As the vector " ! 0, then q" ! 1=2; b q" ! 1=2; q" ! 1=2 so that, as " ! 0 and ± ! 0,
WPN
";± ! WPN in the sense of Painlev¶ e-Kuratowski.
Case 2: Assume that q" < q". For "i;j su±ciently small, if q < q" then J"
1(M;q) strongly
dominates J"
1(T;q), if q" · q · q" then J"
1(M;q) and J"
1(T;q) are not comparable, ¯nally
if q" < q then J"
1(T;q) strongly dominates J"
1(M;q). Also in this case there exists a point
b q" 2 [q";q"] such that J"
1(T;q), J"
1(M;q), J"
1(B;q) lie on the same line; however, di®erently
from the previous case, here when q 2 [q"; b q"[ the set °"
1(q) n fJ"
1(M;q)g is not strongly
Pareto dominated by °"
2(q) and therefore the set W"
1(q) of weak Pareto points in J"
1(X1;q)








2(q) if q 2 [0;q"[
°"
1(q) [ °"




3(q) if q 2 q = b q"
°"
3(q) if q 2]b q";1]









f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q 2 [0;q"[
f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g [ f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 + p2 = 1g if q 2 [q"; b q"[
X1 if q = b q"




5 be the subset of X1 £ X2 such that
P
";±
5 = f(p1;p2;q) jg±(p1;p2) = 0;p1 + p2 = 1;q 2 [q"; b q"]g :
In this case, the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN
";± in the perturbed game is
WPN
";± = P1 [ P2 [ P
";±
3 [ P4 [ P
";±
5 :
Since as " ! 0 we get q" ! 1=2; b q" ! 1=2; q" ! 1=2, then also in this case WPN
";± !
WPN, as " ! 0 and ± ! 0.









f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q 2 [0; b q"[
X1 if q = b q"
f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p2 = 0g if q 2]b q";1]
;
then the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN
";± in the perturbed game is
WPN
";± = P1 [ P2 [ P
";±
3 [ P4:
and, also in this case, WPN
";± ! WPN, as " ! 0 and ± ! 0.
10Summarizing, in each example, we found a game ¡h (h = 1;2) and an open neigh-
borhood (in the space of multicriteria games having the same set of strategies and the
same number of criteria) of ¡h such that every game in this set have uncountably many
weak Pareto-Nash equilibria. Moreover, the equilibria of each ¡h are all essential, that
is \stable" with respect to every perturbation on the data of the game. It could also
be checked that all the equilibria of each ¡h are trembling hand perfect (see Borm, van
Megen and Tijs (1999) for the de¯nition of perfect in multicriteria games).
Note that the ¯rst example is much easier from the mathematical point of view but
it is much less interesting from the game theoretic point of view because in the game ¡1
the best reply correspondence of the ¯rst player coincide with his strategy set for every
strategy of the second player. Therefore, it shows that the results hold in the simplest class
of multicriteria games. The second example shows that the results coming out from the
¯rst example do not depend on the degenerate behavior of the best reply correspondences
and may arise in nontrivial games.
4 Scalarization stable equilibria
As already mentioned in the Introduction, in this section we show that is possible to
re¯ne the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria of the games in the previous section by
considering a non-classical property of stability with respect to perturbations, even if all
these equilibria are essential. Moreover, since this result holds in both the examples,
then it does not depend on the particular form of the best reply correspondences in the
¯rst example. More precisely, we consider a property of stability which deals with the
scalarization technique which is a peculiarity of the vector-valued payo®s case.




i ) in the (r(i)-1)-dimensional simplex ¢(r(i)), it is possible to consider the
scalar game
¡(¸) = fI;X1;:::;Xn;¸1J1;:::;¸nJng
called trade-o® game, where for every player i, the payo® function is de¯ned as ¸iJi(x) = Pr(i)
k=1 ¸k
iJk
i (x) for every x 2 X. In Shapley (1959), it has been proved that:
Proposition 4.1: Let ¡ be the mixed extension of a ¯nite multicriteria game. The
strategy pro¯le x is a weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium (resp. Pareto-Nash equilibrium) for
¡ if and only if there exists a system of weights ¸ 2 ¢(r(1)) £ ¢¢¢ £ ¢(r(n)) (resp.
¸ 2 relint(¢(r(1)) £ ¢¢¢ £ ¢(r(n)))) such that x is a Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950),
(1951)) of the trade-o® game ¡(¸).
To obtain a re¯nement concept which captures the idea of stability shown in the
previous example, we give the following:
Definition 4.2 (De Marco and Morgan (2007)): Let ¡ be a multicriteria game and x0
be a weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium of ¡. Then, x0 is said to be a scalarization-stable
equilibrium (s-stable equilibrium for short) if there exists ¸0 2
Qn
i=1 ¢(r(i)) such that:
i) x0 is a Nash equilibrium of ¡(¸0)
11ii) for every " > 0 there exists ± > 0 such that for every ¸ 2
Qn
i=1 ¢(r(i)) verifying
d(¸;¸0) < ± there exists x 2 E(¸) such that d(x;x0) < ".
Example 4.3: Consider the game ¡1 in the Example 3.1. Let ¸ 2 [0;1], with an abuse
of notation denote with ¸1 = (¸1
1;¸2
1) = (¸;1¡¸). Then, we consider the trade-o® games
¡1(¸) with ¸ 2 [0;1]:
Play. 1, Play. 2 L R
T ¸,1 ¸,0
B 1-¸,0 1-¸,1







f0g 8q 2 [0;1] if ¸ 2 [0;1=2[
X1 8q 2 [0;1] if ¸ = 1=2
f0g 8q 2 [0;1] if ¸ 2]1=2;1]
The set valued function E1(¢) which associates to every ¸ the set of Nash equilibria of the





f(0;0)g if ¸ 2 [0;1=2[
V1 [ V2 [ V3 if ¸ = 1=2
f(1;1)g if ¸ 2]1=2;1]
The equilibrium correspondence E1(¢) is not lower semicontinuous in ¸ = 1=2 . Since
(0;0) and (1;1) are the only equilibria which belong to E1(¸) for some ¸ 6= 1=2 then they
are the only scalarization stable equilibria, that is, Es = f(0;0);(1;1)g.
Example 4.4: Consider the game ¡2 in the Example 3.2. Let ¸ 2 [0;1], with an abuse of
notation denote with ¸1 = (¸1
1;¸2
1) = (¸;1¡¸). Then, we consider the following trade-o®
games ¡2(¸) with ¸ 2 [0;1]:




For every ¸ 2 [0;1] and for every q 2 [0;1], let J1(T;q), J1((M;q), J1((B;q);¸) be the
expected payo® of Player 1 when he plays respectively T;M or B.
Let m(q) = maxfJ1(T;q);J1(M;q)g for all q 2 [0;1] then
m(q) =
½
1 ¡ q if q 2 [0;1=2]
q if q 2]1=2;1]




i) @q 2 [0;1] such that ¸1J1(B;q) ¸ m(q) if¸ 2 [0;3=7[













iv) ¸1J1(B;q) ¸ m(q) 8q 2 [0;1] if¸ 2]2=3;1]
12Denote with ®(¸) = 2¡3¸
1+¸ and ¯(¸) = 3¸¡1
1¡¸ . Then, as ®(¸);¯(¸) 2 [0;1], ¸1J1(B;q)
intersects J1(M;q) for q = ®(¸), and ¸1J1(B;q) intersects J1(T;q) for q = ¯(¸), that is
¸1J1(B;®(¸)) = J1(M;®(¸)) ¸1J1(B;¯(¸)) = J1(T;¯(¸))
Moreover, since ®(¢) and ¯(¢) are increasing in the interval [0;1] and ®(3=7) = ¯(3=7) =





> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <




f(0;1)g if q 2 [0;1=2[
f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 + p2 = 1g if q = 1=2
f(1;0)g if q 2]1=2;1]




f(0;1)g if q 2 [0;1=2[
X1 if q = 1=2
f(1;0)g if q 2]1=2;1]
if ¸ = 3=7
8
> > > > <
> > > > :





f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q = 2¡3¸
1+¸






f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p2 = 0g if q = 3¸¡1
1¡¸














f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 = 0g if q = 2¡3¸
1+¸




¤ if ¸ 2]1=2;2=3]
f(0;0)g if q 2 [0;1] if ¸ 2]2=3;1]
The set valued function E2(¢) which associates to every ¸ the set of Nash equilibria of the
trade o® game ¡2(¸) is given by:
E2(¸) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
f(0;1;0);(1=2;1=2;1=2);(1;0;1)g if ¸ 2 [0;3=7[
f(0;1;0);(1;0;1)g [ f(p1;p2;1=2) jp2 = p1; p1 2]0;1=2]g if ¸ = 3=7
f(0;1;0);(1;0;1)g [
©














[ f(p1;0;1) j p1 2 ]0;1]g if ¸ = 1=2
f(0;1;0g [
©






f(0;0;q) j q 2 [0;1]g [ f(0;p2;0) j p2 2 ]0;1]g if ¸ = 2=3
f(0;0;q) j q 2 [0;1]g if ¸ 2]2=3;1]
13It follows that the equilibrium correspondence E2(¢) is not lower semicontinuous in ¸ =
3=7, ¸ = 1=2 and ¸ = 2=3.
Since the set of equilibria f(p1;p2;1=2) jp2 = p1; p1 2]0;1=2]g belongs only to E2(3=7),
f(p1;0;0) j p1 2 ]0;1]g belongs only to E2(1=2) and f(0;p2;0) j p2 2 ]0;1]g belongs only to
E2(2=3), then they are not scalarization stable equilibria and the set of scalarization stable
equilibria is a proper subset of WPN, i.e..
E
s = P2 [ f(0;1;0);(1=2;1=2;1=2);(1;0;1)g:
Remark 4.5: In De Marco and Morgan (2007) it has been shown that if x is an essential
equilibrium of the trade-o® game ¡(¸) (derived from the multicriteria game ¡) for some
¸ 2 ¢(r(1))£¢¢¢£¢(r(n)) then it is a scalarization stable equilibrium for the multicriteria
game ¡. On the other hand, the previous example shows that there exists (at least)
an essential (weak Pareto-Nash) equilibrium for ¡ which is not a scalarization stable
equilibrium for ¡. Then, it follows that essentiality in a multicriteria game ¡ di®ers from
essentiality in the trade o® games ¡(¸) derived from ¡, since there exists (at least) an
essential (weak Pareto-Nash) equilibrium for ¡ which is not an essential equilibrium of
the trade-o® game ¡(¸) for every ¸ 2 ¢(r(1)) £ ¢¢¢ £ ¢(r(n)).
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